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Synthesis Article 
 
Resilience through Interlinkage: The Green Climate Fund and Climate Finance 
Governance 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a significant and potentially innovative addition to 
UNFCCC frameworks for mobilizing increased finance for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. Yet the GCF faces challenges of operationalization not only as a relatively new 
international fund but also as a result of US President Trump’s announcement that the United 
States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Consequently the GCF faces a major 
reduction in actual funding contributions and also governance challenges at the levels of its 
Board and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) to which it is ultimately 
accountable. This article analyzes these challenges with reference to the GCF’s internal 
regulations and its agreements with third parties to demonstrate how exploiting design 
features of the GCF could strengthen its resilience in the face of such challenges. These 
features include linkages with UNFCCC constituted bodies, particularly the Technology 
Mechanism, and enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially through its 
Private Sector Facility. The article posits that deepening GCF interlinkages would increase 
both the coherence of climate finance governance and the GCF’s ability to contribute to 
ambitious climate action in uncertain times.  
 
Key Policy Insights  
• The Trump Administration’s purported withdrawal from the Paris Agreement creates 
challenges for the GCF operating model in three key domains: capitalization, 
governance and guidance. 
• Two emerging innovations could prove crucial in GCF resilience to fulfil its role in 
Paris Agreement implementation: (1) interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, 
especially the Technology Mechanism; and (2) engagement with non-Party 
stakeholders, especially private sector actors such as large US investors and 
financiers. 
• There is also an emerging soft role for the GCF as interlocutor between policy-makers 
and non-Party actors to help bridge the communication divide that often plagues 
cross-sectoral interactions.  
• This role could develop through: (a) the GCF tripartite interface between the Private 
Sector Facility, Direct Accredited Entities and National Designated Authorities; and 
(b) strengthened collaborations between the UNFCCC Technical and Financial 
Mechanisms. 
 
Keywords: climate change law, climate finance, Green Climate Fund, climate governance, 
Paris Agreement, private sector 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Green Climate Fund (GCF), established in 2010, represents a new kind of funding 
institution in the emerging field of climate finance governance. This is due to its direct 
creation by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the equal representation of developed and 
developing countries on its Board, its pursuit of equal mitigation and adaptation financing, 
and its mandate to engage directly with the private sector. 
 
However, the GCF could face challenges of operationalization not only due to its relatively 
new status as an international fund but also as a result of US President Trump’s 
announcement that the United States (US) would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The 
US became a ratifying party to the Paris Agreement in 2016 under the Administration of 
Barack Obama. In so doing, it became a contributor to the GCF and paid US$1 billion to the 
GCF Trust Fund pursuant to its GCF Contribution Arrangement. The announced withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement by the Trump Administration has now created several governance 
challenges for the GCF including: achieving sufficient capitalization of the Fund; ensuring 
workable Board-level governance of the Fund; and issues relating to oversight and guidance 
of the Fund by the COP1. 
 
 
This article analyzes these challenges in the next section.  In sections 3 and 4, it explores how 
certain design features of the GCF could be utilized to strengthen its resilience or capacity to 
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sustain its operations, and fulfil its mandates in the face of financial or policy shocks, such as 
the withdrawal of pledged US funding. Specifically, we focus on two emerging areas that 
could prove crucial in enabling the GCF’s role in the implementation of the Paris Agreement: 
first, interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and 
second, engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially cities and the private sector. The 
article concludes in Part 5 that a key challenge and opportunity for the GCF in both of these 
areas will be to help improve communication between public institutions, the private sector, 
and local actors in order to build trust, know-how and a project pipeline that can sustain the 
transition to a low carbon and climate-resilient world. 
 
2. The Trump Administration and GCF Governance Challenges 
 
On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US would ‘withdraw’ from the Paris 
Agreement. Specifically, he announced that the US ‘will cease all implementation of the non-
binding Paris Accord and the draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement 
imposes on our country’, including ending implementation of the US Nationally Determined 
Contribution (NDC) (The White House, 2017). Importantly, the US President’s statement 
included a broad condemnation of the GCF, which he described as, among other things, 
“costing the United States a vast fortune”, signalling a dramatic US policy and attitudinal 
change toward it. 
 
This presents at least three challenges for the GCF: first, sufficient capitalization of the Fund; 
second, workable governance of the Fund at Board level; and third, oversight and guidance of 
the Fund by the UNFCCC COP. Each challenge is discussed in turn below. 
 
  4 
2.1 Capitalization of the Fund  
 
Under its 2016 Contribution Arrangement and 2017 addendum with the GCF, the US agreed 
to pay US$3 billion into the GCF’s Trust Fund ‘subject to the availability of funds’ (GCF 
2016, par.1) of which $1 billion was paid by the US under the Obama Administration. 
Therefore, the US repudiation of its prior commitment has created a US$2 billion gap in the 
GCF’s finances. To put this in context, this US$2 billion is deducted from just over US$10 
billion in signed pledges to the GCF (GCF 2018). The change of US policy may be 
particularly disruptive to the Private Sector Facility, given that the Contribution Arrangement 
included the US expectation that at least half of its contributions would support private sector 
activity (GCF 2016). Alongside the US, the other major GCF contributors are the European 
Union and Japan. No party has announced that it will cover the shortfall resulting from the 
US reneging on its funding pledge. 
 
What recourse, if any, does the GCF have against the US for this apparent breach of 
agreement? A ‘Contribution Arrangement’ exists between the GCF and the US; however the 
vast majority of contributing countries to the GCF have signed a ‘Contribution Agreement’. 
Agreements tend to be governed by the GCF Trust Fund Agreement (GCF 2016, par. 2), 
annexed to which are the Standard Provisions Applicable to the Contributions to the Green 
Climate Fund Trust Fund (Standard Provisions) (GCF 2015). The Standard Provisions 
provide that ‘[t]he Fund, the Trustee and the Contributors shall, to the extent possible, strive 
to resolve and settle promptly and amicably questions of interpretation and application of a 
Contribution Agreement and any disputes, controversy or claims arising out of or relating to 
any Contribution Agreement’ (ibid, par 9.1). Where a ‘dispute, controversy or claim’ has not 
been settled in this manner, it ‘shall be settled in accordance with the dispute resolution 
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mechanism set out in the applicable Contribution Agreement, if any such mechanism is so 
specified in that Contribution Agreement’ (ibid, par. 9.2). The apparent purpose of utilizing a 
‘Contribution Arrangement’ designation in the case of the US is to reduce the legally binding 
effect of that document. For example, whilst the US Contribution Arrangement is governed 
by the Standard Provisions mentioned above, the US Contribution Arrangement specifies that 
all instances of the word ‘shall’ in the Standard Provisions are deemed to be ‘will’ for the 
purposes of the US Contribution Arrangement (GCF 2016, par. 9.1), which implies a lower 
standard of obligation for the US. Importantly, unlike most Contribution Agreements, the 
GCF-US Contribution Arrangement sets out no dispute resolution mechanism (in contrast, 20 
Contribution Agreements provide for final and binding arbitration).2 It therefore leaves the 
GCF without any specified recourse to adjudicatory proceedings to recover the missing US$2 
billion. 
 
The GCF was established by the COP as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of 
the UNFCCC; its role in serving the Paris Agreement (as mandated by the COP in 2015) is 
additional and independent. Thus, it would be legally possible for a future US administration 
to resume GCF contributions as a party to the UNFCCC, even if it remained outside the Paris 
Agreement. Indeed, as discussed further below, three Belgian regional governments, none of 
which are parties to either the UNFCCC or Paris Agreement, have pledged contributions to 
the GCF. However, there is currently no indication that this would be the preferred policy of 
a future US administration.  
 
2.2 Board-level Governance of the Fund  
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The GCF’s Governing Instrument provides that the Fund ‘will be governed and supervised by 
a Board that will have full responsibility for funding decisions’ (UNFCCC 2011, par 5). In 
the context of UNFCCC finance, the ‘unusually powerful’ (Thompson, 2016, p.146) and 
autonomous nature of the GCF Board may be contrasted with the Adaptation Fund Board and 
the Global Environment Facility Council (GEF) (Kulovesi 2012). Whereas the GEF Council 
‘shall act in conformity with’ the COP (GEF 2011, par. 15) and the AF Board is ‘under the 
authority and guidance’ of the COP (UNFCCC 2008, par. 4), the GCF Board receives only 
‘guidance’ from the COP and has ‘full responsibility for funding decisions’ (GCF Governing 
Instrument, articles 5-6). The GCF Board has 24 members, equally composed of developing 
and developed countries, and decisions, including investment decisions, must be taken by 
consensus (UNFCCC 2011, paragraph 14). The Rules of Procedure of the Board, which 
supplement the Governing Instrument, provide that the Co-Chairs are responsible for all 
procedural matters, including ‘putting questions to a vote if consensus is not reached’ (GCF 
Board 2013a, paragraph 12). The GCF Secretariat has done some work on options for a 
Board voting system (GCF Board 2015a), but the Board is yet to adopt any such system. In 
practice, the absence of consensus has at times prevented the adoption of decisions, even in 
circumstances where there has been only one holdout. For example, in 2016 India blocked 
approval of a Pakistan-based project until new conditions were added (Sethi 2016). 
 
Currently, the Board includes a US delegate, nominated as one of the representatives of 
developed countries, whose appointment runs until December 2018. Given the current US 
administration’s stated hostility to the GCF, including the claim that the US contribution of 
$1 billion included ‘funds raided out of America’s budget for the war against terrorism’ 
(White House 2017), it is possible that a current or future US Board member will be 
instructed by the administration to frustrate the conduct of the Board’s business, including by 
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blocking funding decisions. At the contentious July 2018 Board meeting, during which the 
Board was unable to find consensus to approve any new projects, the US representative 
called for a ‘donor-driven’ replenishment process (Darby 2018). This approach proved 
divisive given the institutional design of the GCF to achieve balance between donors and 
recipients and due to the US having reneged on the majority of its financial commitments to 
the GCF. 
 
Could a US Board member acting in a disruptive manner be removed from the Board prior to 
the conclusion of the applicable term? The Governing Instrument provides only that ‘[t]he 
members of the Board and their alternates will be selected by their respective constituency or 
regional group within a constituency’ (UNFCCC 2011, paragraph 11). The Rules of 
Procedure add that ‘[a]ny replacement of the Board member or alternate member within a 
term shall be made and notified to the Secretariat by the developed or developing country 
Party or group of these that selected the Board member or alternate member’ (GCF Board 
2013a, par 5). Therefore, the decision to replace an obstructive US Board member would rest 
with the developed country Parties to the UNFCCC as a group. 
 
2.3 Oversight and guidance by the UNFCCC COP 
 
Third, there is the potential challenge to the guidance provided to the GCF by the COP, 
which created the GCF and holds ultimate authority over it. US President Trump has stated 
that even while withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, the US would ‘begin negotiations to 
reenter either the Paris Accord or a really entirely new transaction on terms that are fair to the 
United States, its businesses, its workers, its people, its taxpayers’ (The White House 2017). 
This part of the President’s statement raises the prospect of American negotiators 
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participating actively in UNFCCC negotiations with the stated objective of fundamentally 
amending, or totally replacing, the Paris Agreement. It should be noted, however, that 
multiple governments responded to the US withdrawal statement by reaffirming their 
commitment to the Paris Agreement and stating that it is not open to renegotiation. Moreover, 
at the time of writing, there were no signs of the US Administration attempting to renegotiate 
the Paris Agreement, with the US delegation to the climate negotiations instead maintaining 
long-held technical positions (Jotzo et al, 2018).   
 
The Governing Instrument provides that the GCF ‘will be accountable to and function under 
the guidance of the Conference of the Parties’ (UNFCCC 2011, par 4). Since the GCF’s 
establishment, the COP has regularly provided guidance on a broad range of matters (e.g. the 
Fund’s linkages to the Technology Mechanism, as discussed below), with the GCF Board 
taking up COP guidance in its decisions. Although the COP has occasionally adopted 
decisions over the clear objection of one or more Parties, this has been intensely controversial 
amongst Parties and is not a regular practice (Vogel 2014). In addition to the potential 
problem at GCF Board level, the US could also use its ability to block COP (and now the 
COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement or CMA) consensus 
decisions to thwart the provision of guidance to the GCF. A US ‘veto’ over GCF-related COP 
decisions can therefore be considered a realistic threat, which would last until a change of 
American policy, or in the case of the CMA, until US withdrawal becomes effective in 2020 . 
 
3. Building Linkages Between the Financial Mechanism and the Technology 
Mechanism  
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The GCF faces these challenges in the context of an evolving governance structure that 
makes it tightly interwoven into the broader UNFCCC architecture. These interlinkages, 
including with other entities established by COP decisions and other climate finance 
institutions (Boisson de Chazournes 2015), present opportunities to strengthen the efficacy of 
the GCF in the face of challenges to its operating model. The developing collaboration with 
the UNFCCC’s Technology Mechanism is one such opportunity, in particular as Technology 
Mechanism inputs can help to de-risk investments, make GCF frameworks and funding 
decisions more impactful and better align technology-relevant GCF investments with the 
mandate for a ‘paradigm shift’. These opportunities are particularly significant following the 
withdrawal of promised US funding and as the replenishment process begins. 
 
The Technology Mechanism was created in 2010, at the same time as the GCF was added as 
the second operating entity of the Financial Mechanism alongside the GEF. The Technology 
Mechanism is mandated to facilitate enhanced action on technology development and transfer 
for both mitigation and adaptation. It includes a ‘policy arm’, the Technology Executive 
Committee (TEC) which advises the COP and produces reports on technology matters, and 
an ‘implementation arm’, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) which 
provides technical assistance to developing countries, inter alia. These innovations are very 
positive but have also made the UNFCCC framework of finance for climate technology more 
complex. Soon after the creation of the GCF and Technology Mechanism, scholars identified 
potential for the new finance and technology processes to work in tandem (Sarnoff 2011; 
Burleson 2012). The COP has attempted to address this through a series of decisions to 
enhance the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and Financial Mechanism and 
their respective bodies.  
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In its 2011 decision launching the GCF, the COP requested the GCF Board to collaborate 
with the Adaptation Committee, the TEC and other relevant UNFCCC thematic bodies to 
'define linkages' between the GCF and these bodies (UNFCCC 2011, par 17). In 2012 the 
COP agreed to 'further elaborate', at a subsequent session, the linkages between the 
Convention's Technology Mechanism and Financial Mechanism (UNFCCC 2013a, par 62). 
In 2015, the COP recognized that ‘definition and elaboration of linkages between the 
Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism has the aim of ensuring financial 
resources for, and scaling up action on, technology development and transfer’ 
 (UNFCCC 2016a, par 6) and invited the GCF Board to provide recommendations on 
linkages to the COP and to consider ways to provide support for climate technology in 
developing countries (ibid pars 4, 10). The COP also requested the TEC, CTCN, GEF and 
GCF to continue to consult on and further elaborate linkages, which they are doing (ibid par 
8; TEC 2016).  
 
Importantly, the identification of an ongoing ‘disconnect’ between ‘project developers and 
climate technology companies and financiers and investors’ (UNFCCC 2016b, par 21) has 
spurred work under the UNFCCC to strengthen collaboration between the Convention’s 
Technology Mechanism and Financial Mechanism, including the GCF. Bridging this gap 
between project developers and public and private finance is a key challenge. To this end, it 
has been suggested that the Technology Mechanism and Financial Mechanism entities work 
together to de-risk investments (TEC 2016, par 22(f)). The CTCN and GCF have been 
exploring a partnership along these lines (UNFCCC 2016c, par 88), and in 2017 the GCF and 
UN Environment (for the CTCN) exchanged letters agreeing to collaborate (GCF 2017b). 
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As the Technology and Financial Mechanisms have their own functioning networks of 
organizations to facilitate, respectively, technology assistance and the financing of mitigation 
and adaptation projects, building inter-network cooperation is being pursued at both 
international and national levels. At the international level, the starting point for this work on 
linkages has been the relationships between the governing bodies of the institutions. From its 
inception, the CTCN Advisory Board has included the Chair and Vice-Chair of the TEC and 
a representative from the GCF Board (UNFCCC 2013b, par 3). Representatives of the CTCN 
Advisory Board, the CTCN and (from 2015) the GCF have regularly attended TEC meetings. 
In 2016, the GCF Board decided to hold an annual meeting in conjunction with the COP 'in 
order to enhance cooperation and coherence of engagement between the GCF and 
[UNFCCC] thematic bodies', with the meeting to include the chairs of thematic bodies such 
as the TEC (GCF Board 2016a, par (e)).  
 
At the national level, enhancing cooperation between national designated entities (NDEs, 
which are associated with the CTCN) and national designated authorities (NDAs, which are 
associated with the GCF as explained below) has emerged as a way to bring coherence to 
finance and technology processes within countries. In its key messages to COP 22 in 2016, 
the TEC called for stronger cooperation between national CTCN and GCF focal points 
(UNFCCC 2016c, 53). The COP subsequently reflected this position in its decisions 
(UNFCCC 2016d, par 16). Similarly, the GCF Board at its October 2016 meeting encouraged 
NDAs and focal points to 'coordinate with the Climate Technology Centre and Network’s 
national designated entities in order to enhance cooperation' (GCF Board 2016b, par (e)). 
 
In 2016, the COP further invited GCF NDAs and focal points to utilize the Readiness and 
Preparatory Support Programme (which provides funding for developing countries to engage 
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with the GCF and develop project proposals) to 'conduct technology needs assessments and 
develop technology action plans', and more generally invited developing countries to submit 
'technology-related projects, including those resulting from technology needs assessments 
and from the technical assistance of the Climate Technology Centre and Network', to the 
GEF and GCF (UNFCCC 2016e, pars 6-7). At this time the COP invited the four entities to 
provide information on actions to strengthen linkages in their annual reports and agreed to 
further consider the matter in 2018. This activity illustrates the steps that can be taken to 
build coherence in the activities of transnational structures in distinct but related areas of 
climate policy. Further impetus for strengthening collaboration between the GCF and the 
Technology Mechanism has come from the independent review of the CTCN by consultants 
Ernst and Young, which ‘encourages the CTCN, the GEF and the GCF to continue exploring 
how to further facilitate the provision of sustained funding for CTCN activities and enhance 
operational linkages between the organizations’ (UNFCCC 2017, par 90). In summary, 
enhanced exchanges between the TEC and GCF Board can assist in clarifying the conceptual 
and policy bases for financing climate technology, while operational collaboration between 
the CTCN and GCF can enable more informed and more impactful investments in climate 
technology. 
 
4. Non-Party Stakeholder Engagement with the GCF  
 
In addition to deepening interlinkages between the GCF and other UNFCCC mechanisms, 
GCF resilience and impact can be strengthened by enhanced engagement with non-Party 
stakeholders, including cities and the private sector. Indeed, in the context of the US reneging 
on its pledge to the GCF and creating higher burdens for remaining countries, direct 
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engagement with a wider array of actors is required to ensure greater impact from pledged 
government funds. 
 
4.1 UNFCCC Context and GCF Set-up  
 
Following its adoption, the GCF’s Governing Instrument was hailed as a ‘progressive, 
forward-looking document’, and the Fund itself a potential exemplar of an increasingly 
decentralised and responsive climate governance (Carlarne 2012 at 20-21). For the GCF to 
fulfil this potential, however, deep and ongoing engagement with the non-Party stakeholders 
that command both knowledge and finance will be necessary. Article 9.3 of the Paris 
Agreement exemplifies a traditional model of multilateral climate finance as being provided 
by developed country governments to developing country governments.3 While faithful to 
this model, the GCF is also mandated to develop other modalities and funding relationships, 
including engagement with governments at all levels and also with the private sector, 
including finance actors (GCF Board 2015b). This mandate is particularly important given 
the imprecision of Party obligations to capitalize the GCF (Fridahl et al 2014). 
 
This enhanced engagement by and with non-Party actors is not specific to the GCF but is 
rather a defining characteristic of the broader Paris Agreement process and outcomes. It is 
embodied in the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action which was launched in 
December 2016 by the first High-Level Champions to the Paris Agreement in conjunction 
with the UNFCCC Secretariat and the COP21 and COP22 Presidencies. The Marrakech 
Partnership specifically acknowledges that: 
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 “…public and private entities … have a key role to play in assisting governments to 
translate [Nationally Determined Contributions, or NDCs] into investment-ready 
vehicles as well as to scale up investment in infrastructure that delivers a range of 
benefits, including ones for addressing climate change in cities and communities” 
(COP22 2016 at 1). 
 
The Partnership aims to facilitate cooperative climate action that focuses on ‘the delivery of 
finance, technology and capacity building in developing countries’ for both mitigation and 
adaptation by: regularly convening Party and non-Party actors to identify and address barriers 
to implementation of the Paris Agreement; showcasing successes and encouraging new 
initiatives at each COP; tracking progress of non-state actors’ initiatives through the Non-
State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA); and reporting on achievements and options 
to the COP (ibid at 2-3).  
 
Importantly, the GCF Governing Instrument acknowledges that investments at scale require 
private sector capital, and provides for a Private Sector Facility (PSF) that sits within the 
GCF Secretariat. Further, a Private Sector Advisory Group, comprised of Board members and 
business and civil society representatives, makes recommendations to the Board about how 
best to engage the private sector (GCF Board 2013b, Annex XIX). Initially, in 2010, strong 
emphasis was placed on engaging local (domestic) private sector actors in-country. However, 
this approach was widened to encourage investment engagement in developing countries by 
multinational corporations and other private sector actors based in developed countries (GCF 
Board 2013c). 
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In 2014, the COP requested the GCF Board to accelerate operationalization of the PSF 
through accreditation of entities with relevant experience of working with the private sector 
(UNFCCC 2014, par 9). In response, as discussed further below, a number of organisations 
were granted status as Accredited Entities (institutions which manage GCF-funded projects 
and programmes) in 2015. The Board also established pilot programmes on funding micro-, 
small- and medium-sized enterprise activities that are climate sensitive, with an allocation of 
US$200 million, and on mobilizing funding at scale, with an allocation of up to US$500 
million (see also below).  
 
In short, the objective of the PSF is to ‘fund and mobilize institutional investors and leverage 
GCF’s funds to encourage corporates to co-invest’ (GCF undated(e)). The PSF can be seen as 
the GCF’s major point of difference with preexisting climate finance institutions, and has 
been identified as probably the ‘highest added-value’ of the GCF in the perception of donors 
(De Sepibus 2015). Some developing country parties have also encouraged the GCF to 
develop private sector modalities (see, e.g, AOSIS 2017). To this end, the GCF seeks 
heightened engagement with pension funds, insurance companies, corporations, local and 
regional financial intermediaries, and the capital markets in its activities.  
 
4.2 Specific Points of Interaction by Non-Party Actors with the GCF  
 
There are three main ways in which non-Party actors can engage directly with GCF funding 
processes: philanthropically as donors to the GCF; structurally as Direct Accredited Entities; 
and strategically as co-financiers. Each is discussed in turn below. Prior to its 
operationalization, the GCF was identified as an instance of ‘private finance … being 
increasingly integrated in the core activities of public multilateral funds’ (Vinuales 2014). 
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While this potential is arguably as yet unrealized, the developments discussed below indicate 
that the GCF is moving in this direction. 
 
4.2.1 Philanthropically as Donors  
 
The GCF Governing Instrument provides that ‘[t]he Fund may also receive financial inputs 
from a variety of other sources, public and private, including alternative sources’ (UNFCCC 
2011, Art 30). Alongside government contributions, non-Parties can contribute directly to the 
Fund through its External Affairs division. At the time of writing, in addition to the US$10.3 
billion pledged by Party governments, US$24.3 million have been pledged by three regional 
governments in Belgium; a further US$1.3 million has been pledged by one municipal 
government, namely Paris (GCF, undated(f)). This contribution by Paris is highly significant 
as it demonstrates a precedent for potential sub-national funding from US cities and states 
despite the administration’s planned withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Funding the GCF 
may be of particular interest to US states and cities with a history of proactive climate law 
and regulation, and/or familiarity with green finance and market mechanisms such as 
voluntary carbon trading schemes, for example, California, New York and Seattle (Mathiesen 
2017). In addition, the GCF is encouraging private sector actors to donate to the Fund. 
However, none have done so to date.4 If philanthropy were to become a significant funding 
source for the GCF, it would raise questions of legitimacy and accountability that multilateral 
climate financing instruments have not had to address to date. 
 
4.2.2 Structurally as Direct Accredited Entities 
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As of June 2018, only seven out of 59 Accredited Entities were private sector actors, 
including a mix of transnational and national commercial and investment banks, a US-based 
impact investment fund, and a Mongolian banking and financial services company. However, 
private sector entities account for a larger share of the institutions currently in the 
accreditation ‘pipeline’, that is, seeking accreditation but not yet accredited. No cities have 
yet become Accredited Entities despite that option being available in the GCF Governing 
Instrument.5  
 
The remaining Accredited Entities comprise a mix of government and non-government 
organisations.  Predominant entities are multilateral development banks such as the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and international 
organisations including various UN entities such as the World Meteorological Organization 
and UN Environment. Other types of organisation have been accredited in fewer numbers; 
they include government departments and funds such as the Ministry of Natural Resources of 
Rwanda and the Peruvian Trust Fund for National Parks and Protected Areas, and NGOs 
such as WWF.  
 
There is broad agreement that the pool of Accredited Entities needs to be diversified. Some 
commentators have highlighted the need to include more national development banks and 
local government ministries to augment country ownership (Steele 2016). Others have 
suggested accreditation of more transnational commercial banks, impact investors, and 
private equity funds, using the logic that such actors can best mainstream green investments 
in the real economies of developing countries (Smith and Rai 2015). However, prioritising 
the accreditation of more private sector banks is not without criticism. Transnational 
commercial and investment banks tend to prefer large-scale investments due to lower 
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transaction costs, but these may not succeed in small island developing states and least 
developed countries where smaller-scale and local projects are more appropriate.  In other 
words, such banks tend to prefer types of projects with which they are familiar but which are 
unlikely to be transformational (Rai 2016). This is further confirmed by research which 
suggests a significant ‘implementation gap’ for non-state actor initiatives in developing 
countries (Chan et al. 2018). Critics also highlight that many big banks have conflictual 
internal policies, such as continuing to finance fossil fuels, which run counter to GCF and 
Paris Agreement imperatives (e.g. Kumar 2015; Robinson-Tillett 2015).  
 
Thus, diversification beyond big banks would be a positive step. Indeed, diversification ought 
to embrace entirely new categories of actor within the private sector. However, doing so may 
depend on resolving the current uncertainty over what kinds of entity are eligible for 
accreditation. In response to a request from the GCF Board, the GCF’s Accreditation 
Committee proposed the option of a ‘principles‐based approach to accreditation’, with 
applicants to be assessed on the basis of (inter alia) ‘[a] record of deploying finance through 
open untied procurement’ and ‘[a] proven capacity to implement projects effectively’ (GCF 
Board 2017a, par 8). The Accreditation Committee also reported that some of its members 
recommended deeming some entities to be ‘ineligible’ for accreditation, including 
consultancies which are ‘unlikely to have a track record or capacity as implementing 
agencies’ and may be ‘better suited to partner as service providers or advisors to GCF‐funded 
activities’ (GCF Board 2017a, par 9). In October 2017, the GCF Board decided to commence 
a review of the accreditation framework and tasked the GCF Secretariat to develop a 
framework revision proposal that  ‘includes other modalities for institutions to work with the 
GCF’ (GCF Board 2017b). This review was ongoing at the time of writing. In our view, the 
most sensible approach will be for the GCF Board to consider which additional actors might 
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best help the Fund to fulfill its mandate to ‘promote the paradigm shift towards low-emission 
and climate-resilient development pathways’ (UNFCCC 2011, Art 2).  
 
On this point, a little-remarked fact about the current list of Accredited Entities is its complete 
lack of private sector legal and regulatory specialists. Yet this omission is striking, given that 
a critical challenge for developing countries in accessing finance is to create an enabling legal 
and policy environment that can attract investment (see e.g. Gramkow and Anger-Kraavi 
2018). As mentioned above, the GCF is mandated to help countries not just through increased 
financial flows for projects but also through financial support for building endogenous 
capacity. Thus, developing robust national legal and regulatory frameworks for the receipt of 
public climate finance (through, for example, a national climate fund), as well as proactively 
incentivising private investments from local and transnational actors (through, for example, 
domestic financial regulation and corporate and taxation legislation) will be critical. Indeed, 
some multilateral development banks are already moving on this issue. For example, under its 
Law and Policy Reform Program, the Asian Development Bank provides technical assistance 
to developing countries to support legal and institutional development and capacity 
strengthening for climate investments (Morita and Pak, 2018). Importantly, having legal and 
regulatory frameworks in place not only increases the economic and financial attractiveness of 
climate-related investments (eg tariff controls or tax credits) but also encourages investor 
confidence by reducing perceived regulatory and sovereign risks. Clearly, building that kind 
of capacity requires development of legal and regulatory expertise in-country. An important 
corollary of building legal capacity for regulatory frameworks is that this strengthens country 
ownership in financial processes, helping to address the concern that over-involvement by the 
private sector and/or financial institutions would devolve or contract out government 
engagement and thus undermine a country-driven approach. 
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In short, in order to facilitate legal and regulatory (capacity building) proposals for GCF 
funding, there is an argument for law firms and other regulatory and governance experts to 
become Accredited Entities, alongside financial institutions and actors.  
 
4.2.3  Strategically as Co-financiers  
 
A third entry point for non-Party engagement with the GCF is by the private sector providing 
co-finance for projects and programmes as mobilized and leveraged by the PSF. 
 
By June 2018 the GCF had committed of US$3.7 billion in total financing and 76 projects 
had been approved for funding, with public sector funding slightly greater than private sector 
funding (60% vs 40%) (GCF, undated(g)). Yet, although nearly half of GCF funding to date 
has come from the private sector, it has been either for mitigation-only or cross-cutting 
projects. As at March 2018 only one adaptation-only project had been privately funded.  
 
This is particularly important for the objectives of the Fund and interlinkage. There is no 
doubt that public funding is crucial for adaptation projects given that their returns tend to be 
social and not financial. Community benefits – known as ‘social returns’ - of investments in 
areas such as airports, utilities, or seawalls, are typically outside the scope of private sector 
investment decision-making, and the long planning timeframes for major infrastructure – 
often amounting to several decades - present challenges for business case evaluations 
(Bowman 2015). Yet the statistics above raise the question of whether public money could be 
better leveraged by the GCF to incentivise private investment for adaptation through 
innovative approaches. This could provide new business opportunities and also highlight 
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climate-related risks that exist for the private sector (Pauw 2015). Some have argued that 
such innovation is imperative, not just for adaptation, but for projects across the board if the 
GCF is to reach its $100 billion target (Michaelowa, Allen and Sha 2018). A potential 
innovation would be to increase the use of guarantees to de-risk investments. The GCF 
Portfolio Dashboard shows that grants and loans are the preferred GCF financial instruments 
with their use at 86% combined. In contrast, equity accounts for only 11%, and guarantees 
for only 3% of GCF financial instruments (across all projects) (GCF undated(g)). Given the 
importance of guarantees for de-risking investments, this is surprising. Certainly, a guarantee 
transfers project risk to government (and ultimately the taxpayer), so public guarantees add 
risks to government balance sheets which can be a deterrence to using them. However, that 
risk can be mitigated by conscientious legal design of the guarantee, for which legal and 
regulatory expertise is required. Arguably, addressing such barriers is part of the GCF’s role.  
 
By utilising guarantees and also encouraging more equity, the GCF could mobilise private 
investment in adaptation through support for research and development, financing 
technology, and facilitating insurance for climate-resilient infrastructure and agriculture 
(Steele 2016). Indeed, these options could create an entry point for engagement by 
commercial banks and insurance companies that could genuinely add value. 
 
In addition to co-financing, in 2017, the GCF directly invited private sector applications for 
funding by launching a US$500 million request for proposals (RFP). The RFP invited entities 
to ‘propose projects and programmes that deploy private sector investment in support of 
mitigation and adaptation activity in developing countries’ and which are ‘designed to crowd 
in private sector investment that fits within national climate priorities’ and ‘at scale’ (Cooper 
2017).  
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This RFP demonstrates two positive developments in the GCF approach to private sector 
engagement. First, the RFP is open to private actors that are not yet accredited with the GCF. 
The reason is to attract more and different private sector GCF partners such as corporates and 
institutional investors. This is a step in the right direction for enhancing diversification of 
Accredited Entities. Second, proposals may incorporate requests for grants to support 
capacity building such as technical support, training, and regulatory framework development. 
Indeed, proposals will be evaluated on their proposed level of impact, which includes 
‘regulatory reform or development’ to ‘prompt a positive change in the market or regulatory 
environment that will enable future investment into climate activity’ and also ‘institutional 
capacity building’ in ‘local markets for further investments in climate activity’ (GCF Board 
2017c, par 7). Thus, legal and regulatory capacity building are identified by the GCF as core 
elements of desirable GCF projects/programmes. In this way, the GCF seeks to attract new 
high-impact projects/programmes as well as more varied private sector partners.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The planned US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has created several governance 
challenges for the GCF, namely sufficient capitalization of the Fund, workable Board-level 
governance of the Fund, and oversight and guidance of the Fund by the UNFCCC COP. The 
funding challenge is already felt; whether the governance challenges are latent or realized 
will depend on the instructions by the administration to US representatives in the climate 
negotiations and on the GCF Board. Yet this article has contended that two emerging 
innovations could prove crucial in the face of these challenges to enable the GCF to fulfil its 
role in implementing the Paris Agreement. . First, interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, 
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especially the Technology Mechanism; and second, engagement with non-Party stakeholders, 
especially cities and the private sector.  
 
Regarding the latter area of non-Party engagement, the GCF PSF aims to respond to a 
‘significant market gap and an unmet demand for innovative approaches and financial 
instruments’ concerning the mobilisation of the private sector, especially in developing 
countries (GCF Board 2017c, par 3). This gap is particularly acute concerning adaptation, 
with limited public sector investment thus far resulting in ‘little to no leverage of private 
sector finance’ (ibid, par 7). In the context of the US reneging on its pledge to the GCF, and 
broader strain on public sector budgets in many developed countries, the attractions of direct 
engagement with the private sector are clear. By using GCF resources to leverage private 
sector investment, the GCF is able to achieve a greater impact from the funds pledged to it by 
governments. In addition, by reducing barriers to, and building the capacity of, private sector 
investment in developing countries, the GCF is able to broaden the base of climate finance. 
The GCF has been critised for its excessively ‘state-centric governance’ (in contrast to 
‘multi-stakeholder governance’) (Abbott and Gartner 2012). Deeper engagement with non-
Party stakeholders as Accredited Entities and through the PSF may also serve to address this 
concern. 
 
These dynamics could strengthen the resilience of the GCF and its project pipeline, in the 
face of disruptions such as the US renunciation of its funding pledge. In this context, the role 
of the private sector is both crucial and positive. Most large US investors and financiers, 
especially those that operate transnationally, do not support the administration’s putative 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Indeed, investors and companies that together 
represent US$2.5 trillion in assets under management have joined the We Are Still In 
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campaign, whereby over 1650 different American entities have declared their ongoing 
‘support [for] climate action to meet the Paris Agreement’, including cities and states, finance 
actors such as pension fund CalPERS and insurer Allianz, and large corporations such as 
IBM, Google and Tesla (We are Still In, undated).7  
 
Importantly, our analysis reveals that there is a new and clear role for the GCF through its 
engagement with non-Party actors, a role that is softer – but no less important - than the three 
hard intersection points provided in this article. That is, the GCF could be a key interlocutor 
between law- and policy-makers and private sector financiers. Playing this role could help 
bridge the divide amongst these key players by providing modalities of communication and 
know-how to overcome the connection issues that so often plague cross-sectoral interactions, 
and which some say ought to be the focus of future COPs (e.g. Callaghan and Tennant 2017). 
As this article has posited, a good place to start this soft process is through the tripartite 
interface between the GCF PSF, Direct Accredited Entities and NDAs within the GCF 
framework, and by continuing to strengthen interlinkages between the Technology and 
Financial Mechanisms within the broader UNFCCC matrix. 
1 The US administration’s announced withdrawal from the Paris Agreement cannot come into effect until 
November 2020 due to Article 28 of the Agreement, which provides that withdrawal will take three years from 
the date the Agreement gained legal force for the ratifying nation (being 4 November 2016) plus another year. 
However, as suggested by Brändlin (2017), the question of what will happen to the GCF in the interim pushes 
consideration of this issue into the present.  
2 Most Contribution Agreements specify a binding dispute resolution mechanism, e.g. Trust Fund Contribution 
Agreement among the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Green Climate Fund, and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, serving as the interim trustee of the Green Climate Fund Trust Fund 
concerning the Green Climate Fund Trust Fund (MTO No. 069022), 10 March 2016, par. 10. On the role of 
arbitration in relation to both the Paris Agreement and the Green Climate Fund, see Levine, J., 2016. Climate 
Change Disputes: The PCA, The Paris Agreement and Prospects for Future Arbitrations. ACICA Review 35–
39.] 
3 Multilateral financing is only one form of climate finance. Overall, more climate finance is raised 
domestically than internationally, and more funding comes from private rather than public sector sources (CPI 
2017). 
4 In both 2017 and 2018, former New York mayor Michael Bloomberg announced that he would contribute 
funding to the UNFCCC Secretariat to make up for funding cuts by the US administration, but this funding is 
intended for UNFCCC Secretariat operations and not for the GCF (Bloomberg 2017; Bloomberg 2018). 
5 Part of the reason may be that local authorities cannot meet the standards of the GCF in order to become 
accredited, which includes high fiduciary standards and social and environmental safeguards. For a deeper 
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discussion of cities and the GCF, see e.g. Junghans, L., Eckstein, D., Kreft, S., Syberg, M., Weischer, L. 2016. 
‘Going to town: How the Green Climate Fund can support a paradigm shift in cities’, Germanwatch, 
https://germanwatch.org/en/download/14845.pdf 
7 However there is a notable lack of American commercial and investment banks on the list. Undoubtedly their 
preference is to declare support for regulatory (not political) initiatives such as the Financial Stability Board’s 
recommendations on climate-related corporate disclosures: Statement of Support for the TCFD 
Reccomendations and Supportive Quotes (June 2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/statement-support-supporting-
companies-june-2017/  
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